The Progressive Response

Volume 8, Number 9
March 26, 2004

Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)

We Count on Your Support!
Foreign Policy In Focus	www.fpif.org

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

I. Updates and Out-Takes

AFGHANISTAN'S PROBLEMATIC PATH TO PEACE: LESSONS IN STATE BUILDING IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA
By Mark Sedra & Peter Middlebrook

THE NEW AFGHAN CONSTITUTION: A STEP BACKWARDS FOR DEMOCRACY
By James Ingalls

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS: A QUESTION OF LAW AND MORALITY
By Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis

SECRECY: THE REAL MOTHER OF TERROR
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

ONE YEAR AFTER THE INVASION: BAGHDAD AND BEYOND
By Tom Barry

II. Letters and Comments

A SLOW MASSACRE IN LEBANON

YOU CANNOT NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA

RESPONSE BY RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

I. Updates and Out-Takes

AFGHANISTAN'S PROBLEMATIC PATH TO PEACE: LESSONS IN STATE BUILDING IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA
By Mark Sedra & Peter Middlebrook

(Editor’s Note: The Afghanistan donors meeting scheduled for March 30-April 1, 2004 finds Afghanistan’s reconstruction process at a crossroads. In this excerpt of a new special report (available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html, also see the PDF version for some spectacular photos) Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook identify the steps that donors would need to take to place Afghanistan’s reconstruction on a trajectory that would strengthen prospects for development and democratization.)

Afghanistan's state-building process has reached a crossroads. With a constitution ratified and the country's first elections in decades scheduled for June-July 2004--although the continued deterioration of security conditions have placed this target in doubt--the Bonn political process has entered its final phase.

Afghanistan can boast of many remarkable achievements over the past two years: the adoption of a national development and budget framework, the reform of central government ministries, the return of millions of children to school, the repatriation of 2.5 million refugees and the resettlement of 600,000 internally displaced peoples (one of the largest voluntary refugee influxes in history), the introduction of a new currency (the Afghani), and the adoption of a constitution through a democratic process. However, in spite of these advancements, security remains precarious, and the vast majority of the population has yet to see a peace dividend.

A renewed political process--one that is inclusive of the country's ethnic and political diversity and that reflects the realities of the situation on the ground--is required to keep the state-building process from veering off course. To forge this new political agenda, it is necessary to take stock of the lessons learned during the past two years. The significance of this exercise transcends Afghanistan. As the first state-building experiment of the post-September 11 era, the Afghan experience could potentially yield tremendous insight for the rehabilitation of other failed states. Although one must be wary when developing universalistic models for processes that are so complex and context-specific, such critical deconstructions are valuable nevertheless.

The principal challenges that confront Afghanistan's state-building process can be summarized under the following four headings: security sector reform; public administration and civil service reform; coordination and government ownership; and donor funding and economic development. Setbacks, primarily relating to the delivery of reconstruction assistance and the complexity of re-engaging with a largely dysfunctional state, have been encountered in each of these areas, revealing deficiencies in the Bonn framework.

First, Afghanistan's security sector reform process has proceeded at an excruciatingly slow rate and has been marred by a lack of funding, inadequate planning and coordination, and adverse security conditions. Second, Afghanistan faces an acute capacity deficit, particularly in regard to the government civil service, a residual effect of the three-decade civil war. Compounding this problem is the legacy of bloated and cumbersome bureaucratic structures, plagued by inefficiency and corruption, and an anaemic private sector, the result of three decades of economic stagnation and the large-scale exodus of human and material capital.

Third, experience in other post-conflict settings clearly dictates that a state-building process will be hard-pressed to succeed if it is not directed by indigenous institutions. Given the poor condition of Afghanistan's national institutions, this means that the re-establishment of core state capabilities--the glue that binds central and subnational governments--will take far longer than originally anticipated. In essence, sustainable reform cannot be achieved if it is donor-driven. Insufficient coordination among the various stakeholders and programs has also hindered reform efforts from their inception, particularly in the area of security. Rivalries, suspicion, and a lack of communication between Afghan government ministries and donor states has had a negative effect.

Lastly, reconstructing a post-conflict state and rejuvenating its economy is an expensive and long-term proposition. By most established measures, Afghanistan is one of the most impoverished countries in the world, with up to 70% of the population living below the poverty line. Until the Afghan population is presented with the economic means and opportunity to escape destitution, many will continue to be drawn to violence and the illicit economy, perpetuating the country's seemingly interminable instability.

Reconstruction funds are minimal, and it is vital that they are disbursed in a manner that maximizes their impact. Presently, the bulk of donor support delivered to Afghanistan has been allocated to projects outside the National Development Budget, either toward covert programs in the security sector or toward favored donor contractors, agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in the public sector. By circumventing line ministries in the disbursement of aid and largely bypassing the Afghan private sector, donors have effectively disempowered the government and divested it of its leadership role in the process. The utility and impact of money channeled to indigenous institutions far outstrips that of direct donor investment. Although a rational sequence between the volume of direct funding and the capacity of government to manage such resources needs to be observed, there is clearly a relationship between how and where resources are targeted and capacities built.

Each of the aforementioned issues is representative of broader dilemmas prevalent in all state-building cases. Addressing them will require a shift in conventional donor approaches to state building. Of course, the entire process is contingent on durable donor commitments, something that is by no means assured. Only two years after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, initial signs of donor fatigue are apparent. The creation of an accountable and efficient security sector, a vibrant economy, and a stable and democratic political system requires the long-term vigilance of Afghans, neighboring countries, the international community, and donors.

The notion that states can be rebuilt after decades of conflict in a two-year period is fallacious and will only distort the process. Afghans, whose expectations were heightened after the Tokyo Conference in early 2002, will be the first to turn their backs on the new administration, unless improvements in security and access to basic services are achieved. The forthcoming Berlin Conference, scheduled for March 30 - April 1, 2004, will debate the political, security, and reconstruction needs of Afghanistan. The Afghan government, in partnership with key international stakeholders, has presented an investment program costing $28 billion. For the conference to be successful, the lessons learned over the past two years need to be understood and heeded.

(Mark Sedra is a research associate at the Bonn International Center for Conversion. He recently returned from Afghanistan, where he spent two months assessing the needs of the Afghan security sector on behalf of the UN and the Afghan government. He writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org). Peter Middlebrook is an independent consultant who has been working in Afghanistan since early 2002. He was centrally involved in coordinating the recent exercise that produced the report titled “Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Pathway Forward.” He holds a doctorate in rural poverty reduction and institutional reform from the University of Durham (U.K.) and has worked on poverty and political economy reforms in numerous countries over the past 15 years.)

THE NEW AFGHAN CONSTITUTION: A STEP BACKWARDS FOR DEMOCRACY
By James Ingalls

(Editor’s Note: In this excerpt from a new special report (available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afghanconst.html) analyst James Ingalls explores how the Bush administration’s choice to forge strategic alliances with warlords in Afghanistan has undermined broader efforts for genuine democratization.)

On January 4, 2004, 502 delegates agreed on a Constitution for Afghanistan, an act many have described as a positive step toward democracy. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad wrote: “Afghans have seized the opportunity provided by the United States and its international partners to lay the foundation for democratic institutions and provide a framework for national elections.” Judging by who was allowed to participate, their manner of participation, and the document itself, the foundation set by the delegates and their foreign overseers was precisely antidemocratic.

The constitutional Loya Jirga (grand council) was the third in a series of events prescribed at the December 2001 Bonn meetings for building a post-Taliban Afghanistan consistent with the interests of the United States. The first event was the Bonn meeting itself, the second was the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, and the fourth will be presidential elections, scheduled for June 2004.

Like the first two milestones in the Bonn process, the constitutional meetings were notorious in that the Afghan warlords of the Northern Alliance, also known as the United Front, and other jihadi (holy warrior) factions were allowed to participate as legitimate representatives of the people. At the Bonn meetings and in the emergency Loya Jirga, warlords had been awarded prominent seats in the government of President Hamid Karzai in exchange for compliance with U.S. goals.

The constitutional meeting this winter did nothing to reverse the trend. According to John Sifton of Human Rights Watch, the process of selecting representatives for the assembly was characterized by “vote-buying, death threats and naked power politics.”

“Human Rights Watch documented numerous cases of local military or intelligence commanders intimidating candidates and purchasing votes. In Kabul, guarded by international security forces, intelligence and military officials were openly mingling with candidates at an election site. Many candidates complained of an atmosphere of fear and corruption. In areas outside of Kabul, many independent candidates were too afraid to even run. In a few cases, factional leaders themselves were elected--despite rules barring government officials from serving as delegates. The majority of the 502 delegates to the Loya Jirga were members of voting blocs controlled by military faction leaders, or warlords. Some good people were elected, but they were outnumbered--and scared.”

The warlords are able to participate, not because a majority of Afghans want them there, but because Washington decided to use them first as suppliers of ground troops to help oust the Taliban and then as governors to help control the population once the Taliban rulers were gone. In the emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002, the U.S. and UN ensured that Northern Alliance leaders became entrenched in power as ministers of the transitional government, an illegal outcome according to the Bonn rules.

The Washington Post reported in December a “new strategy” that includes “wooing some Taliban members.” The head of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno maintains: “Those who are criminals must be held accountable, but for the rank and file, the noncriminals, there will be opportunities for reconciliation and reintegration.” In practice, however, the criminality of the Taliban extends only to those who defy Washington. Those who obey, no matter how highly placed, are allowed “reintegration,” that is, power. For example, the former Defense Minister of the Taliban Mullah Abdul Razzak has joined Jaishul Muslim, an offshoot of the Taliban based in Peshawar, Pakistan. According to Asia Times Online, the group developed as a result of an effort by “the Pakistani and U.S. intelligence establishments” to create “a proxy organization” that would “split the Taliban and reduce the intensity of its resistance movement.” The goal is to use Jaishul Muslim “to sway Taliban commanders with the offer of a place in the government.” The organization “has little, if any, support within Afghanistan itself,” but as far as Washington is concerned, popular support has never been a necessary condition for governing a country.

An alternate, equally consistent approach would have been to disarm and weaken all armed factions, refusing to deal with any group guilty of human rights violations, including both the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. This approach, based on principles rather than power, is foreign to Washington power brokers but has practical underpinnings. A recent report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, a Kabul-based think tank, finds that the current process, “based on impunity,” is “inherently unstable and unsustainable.” According to the report, “it is past perpetrators of violence who are the cause of insecurity today and the greatest threat to Afghanistan's future… [I]f perpetrators are not punished for their violations, they will repeat their acts and the cycle of impunity and insecurity will continue endlessly.” The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, a political and humanitarian organization outspoken in its denunciation of fundamentalist groups like the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, goes further: “Unless the West stops backing the Northern Alliance fundamentalists and starts supporting the independence-loving and freedom-loving forces, it…will be haunted by the threat of inhuman incidents like 11th of September…”

(James Ingalls is a founding director of the Afghan Women’s Mission, a U.S.-based nonprofit organization that works in solidarity with the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). He is also a staff scientist at the Spitzer Space Telescope Science Center, California Institute of Technology. This special report is a revised version of a presentation originally given at the World Social Forum in Mumbai, January 2004.)

For other recent FPIF analysis on Afghanistan see:

Afghan Women Continue to Fend for Themselves
By Sonali Kolhatkar (March 2004)
http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afghanwom.html

Are the Taliban Really “Gone”?
By Mark Sedra (March 2004)
http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004taliban.html

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS: A QUESTION OF LAW AND MORALITY
By Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403bugging.html .)

The conflict in Iraq has raised a number of questions concerning the integrity and professionalism of the intelligence services of the United Kingdom and the United States. Another embarrassing episode from the days preceding the war on Iraq has now flared up, following the decision of the British Crown Prosecution Service to drop charges against Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) whistleblower Katharine Gun. In March 2003, she revealed in a leaked email that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had decided to eavesdrop on UN Security Council diplomats belonging to the group of “swing nations” that were undecided on the question of war against Iraq. The NSA requested the help of its British counterparts at GCHQ to collect information on these diplomats.

Espionage involving electronic surveillance or “bugging” of conversations is not a new occurrence in world politics. During the Second World War, Stalin had Roosevelt bugged, so that he could properly prepare against any arguments that the western allies would present regarding the future division of Europe. During the cold war, embassies in Moscow had networks of listening devices hidden in the walls. Western intelligence even dug tunnels under the Berlin wall in order to tap into Soviet military communications networks. As any card-player would testify, you can never underestimate the value of knowing your opponent's hand. But the same player would also say that there are rules for the game, and that cheating can be a hazardous affair.

The difference today, however, is the scope of the technologies available to the U.S. and UK intelligence agencies. To a large extent, these technological capabilities are unknown, but what is certain is that surveillance equipment has grown increasingly sophisticated over the years. For example, it is no longer necessary to place a hidden microphone in a room, when lasers directed at a window can measure the vibrations in the glass, and a computer can translate these vibrations into recognizable speech. The Australian Defense Signals Directorate has confirmed the existence of a world-wide network called Echelon, and while its capabilities are veiled behind a cloak of secrecy, articles and stories suggest it is capable of intercepting huge amounts of email, telephone, and fax traffic. This information is sifted through super-computers capable of recognizing and red-flagging certain key-words for further analysis.

Thus, according to James Bamford, a specialist in intelligence, every 60 minutes the U.S. and British intelligence agencies intercept millions of telephone calls, emails, and faxes.

Judicial authorities of most nations and, for example, the European Court of Human Rights, have recognized the intrusiveness of bugging. Therefore, the rights of law enforcement agencies to bug suspects are normally operated under judicial oversight. In addition, national courts are usually only empowered to authorize the bugging of suspects of serious crimes, such as murder, armed robbery, or narcotics trade.

The glaring contradiction in the UK-U.S. posture toward the UN seems to be lost on Downing Street and the White House. On the one hand, Bush administration and Whitehall officials declare that war was necessary to uphold the authority of the UN Security Council against alleged Iraqi denial and deception. President Bush even cited the electronic bugging of UN weapon inspectors by Iraqi officials in his eve of war address to the nation. On the other hand, the U.S. and British governments target the Security Council for espionage and outright subversion.

More needs to be done to protect the sanctity of the United Nations. This is largely a question of political will, although updating the Vienna Convention to close loopholes and to reflect changes in surveillance technologies in the past 40 years would also help. Illegitimate bugging activities cannot be permitted if the international community wants to foster an environment where treaties and agreements are concluded in good faith. And while the short-term benefits of bugging friends, allies, and international organizations may be tempting for any government, the long-term costs are surely too high.

(Dr. Ian Davis is the Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC, www.basicint.org) and Andreas Persbo is a consultant for BASIC. This is reprinted with permission by Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

SECRECY: THE REAL MOTHER OF TERROR
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403terror.html .)

The Washington Times headline (March 9), reporting on the latest Gallup Poll, said it all: “Terrorism Ranks Highest as ‘Critical Threat' to U.S.”

Given other recent headlines, this one--and the accompanying story, which cites the spread of weapons of mass destruction as a close companion critical threat--begs an increasingly pertinent question about the core relationship between the people and their political leadership. The question and the relationship concern trust, trust that officials are interpreting data and trends properly and honestly reporting these to the public, who in a democracy are sovereign; trust that, given the prevailing conditions, appropriate precautions and plans are in hand; and trust that security procedures and processes are balanced by the strictest observance of and respect for the constitutional safeguards involving individual rights and protections.

Such considerations point to two levels of trust--between elected officials and the public and between sovereign nations--both of which seem to be fraying as the country moves further and further from September 11, 2001, and from the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

By happenstance, the same March morning that the Gallup results appeared, CIA chief George Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services that his agency had never agreed with crucial pre-war “findings” about Iraq made by an ad hoc Pentagon “intelligence cell.” That organization reportedly told officials in Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's offices that an operational relationship existed between Iraq and al Qaeda, implying collaboration in the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and further implying future collaboration.

In response, senators noted that the July 18, 2003 publicly released portions of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) cautioned that Iraq could employ its purported weapons of mass destruction against mainland U.S. targets, a judgment that Senator Carl Levin (MI) said was not in the classified version of the entire NIE. (The pertinent declassified NIE excerpt read: “Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks--more likely with biological than chemical agents--probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.”) This discrepancy was reinforced by an unclassified October 7, 2002, letter from Tenet to Senator Bob Graham (FL) that stated: “Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States …. [But] Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.”

This linking of September 11-al Qaeda-Iraq-weapons of mass destruction in the public's perception was the basis on which the administration first justified its long-planned invasion of Iraq. That the unclassified material the public received tilted toward (“probably” and “might”) action by Saddam-al Qaeda rather than away (“unlikely” or “might not”) while the classified version took a different view, suggests policymakers believed they would not be called to account as these conflicting assessments would never come to light.

(Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)

ONE YEAR AFTER THE INVASION: BAGHDAD AND BEYOND
By Tom Barry

(Editor's Note: This is the second in a series of investigative reports on the influence of a web of right-wing organizations and individuals--chiefly associated with the Project for the New American Century--on setting radical new directions in U.S. foreign and military policy. This is an excerpt of a longer piece available in full from IRC’s Right Web project at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0403anniv.php .)

In defiance of world opinion and the UN Security Council--but with the support of the U.S. Congress--the Bush administration invaded Iraq in March 2003. A year later it's still too soon to evaluate the success of the mission.

A few quick judgments, though, certainly can be made. The “liberation” was not the cakewalk that Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz had predicted, and the promised liberation has turned into a woeful occupation. Moreover, regime change and preventive war in Iraq cannot be chalked up as victories in the administration's much-vaunted war on terrorism. Before the invasion there existed no ties between the Hussein government and the al Qaeda terrorist network, but a year of U.S. occupation has sparked a wave of anti-American Islamic militancy in Iraq. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist band were never favored or sheltered by the secular Ba'athist regime in Iraq, and bin Laden remains at large. Meanwhile, the Taliban and its ilk are resurgent in occupied Afghanistan.

What's less clear is to what degree the regime change in Iraq has furthered the Bush administration's larger mission of restructuring the Middle East in ways that further U.S. and Israeli national interests, as defined by the hard-liners and ideologues in both nations. An overly narrow focus on the missteps and misadventures in the political quicksand of Iraq misses what administration officials and neoconservative polemicists call “the big picture.”

In speeches at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2003, President Bush sketched out an interventionist foreign and military policy in the Middle East. This new policy, according to the president, is a “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East,” which he describes as “the calling of our time, the calling of our country.” The president's “axis of evil” and “global democratic revolution” formulations of the complexities of international affairs closely reflect the views of neocon ideologues and their institutions. But the details of this ambitious regional agenda, together with its ideological and political backdrop come into sharp relief in the operations of such neocon-driven front groups as the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, the U.S. Committee for a Free Lebanon, the Coalition for Democracy in Iran, and, of course, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).

The country-specific details and the ideological and political backdrop of this transformative foreign policy agenda are clearly delineated by several neocon analysts. The most recent articulation of the neocon global strategy is found in a new book, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, by AEI fellows Richard Perle and David Frum. Billed as a “manual for victory” in the war on terror, the book suggests “reinvigorating homeland security with a new security agency; waging a global campaign against the terrorist ideology…” Among the book's proposals are: funneling U.S. aid to Iranian dissidents to help them overthrow their government; promoting the secession of Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province; and rejecting the jurisdiction of the United Nations Charter, unless it is modified to accommodate the doctrine of preemption. According to Frum and Perle, militant Islam has replaced communism as the main threat to U.S. and global security. “There is no middle way for Americans,” they write. “It is victory or holocaust.”

(Tom Barry is Policy Director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), online at: www.irc-online.org.)

II. Letters and Comments

A SLOW MASSACRE IN LEBANON

Re: It's Time to Engage, Not Isolate, Syria

In this article the author appears to be interested only in the U.S. narrow national interests and does not take into account the death of a people and a country. What Syria is doing in Lebanon is a slow massacre of a whole people and an entire country.

- Resistant <gabymour@yahoo.fr>

YOU CANNOT NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA

Re: It's Time to Engage, Not Isolate, Syria

You cannot compare Libya and Vietnam to Syria. This country has been operating as a ruthless dictatorship for over 30 years now and not only brutally represses its own people, it is occupying another country--namely Lebanon. Prior to its occupation by Syria, Lebanon was a pluralistic, open, democratic country which was an example for other Arab countries to follow. Syria forced its way into the country, corrupted its politicians, assassinated the ones who they could not corrupt, and is draining the country of its young educated class, as well as financial and other resources.

You cannot negotiate with Syria for the simple reason that the current leadership will use any outside negotiation as international acceptance of their regime, and will continue to repress their own people. The recent demo by local Kurds, and the repressive response by the Syrian government is a very recent example. Another would be the sacking of Homms in the early 80s.

- Elias Sukkar <cedop@optushome.com.au>

RESPONSE BY RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

I thank the readers for taking time to respond to my article. I would like to first address the common issue raised by both responses regarding the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. I state quite clearly in the second paragraph of my article that I favor an end to the occupation begun in 1976. Therefore, I view both reader comments as differing over the question of means, not ends, to reach this objective. In that regard, I would point out that many Syrian reformers themselves have stated publicly that the hard-line policies of the Bush administration have been counter-productive in encouraging socioeconomic and political reform in Syria. In lieu of additional sanctions, which will further isolate the Syrian people (as well as U.S. policymakers from events in Syria), I believe a more effective approach to change and reform is to maximize engagement, exchange, and dialogue between Syria and the United States, at both the official and unofficial levels of Syrian society. Based on personal experience in Libya and Vietnam, I have found this to be the most effective way to open closed, shuttered societies.

Finally, let me address Elias Sukkar’s suggestion that Libya and Vietnam are not comparable to Syria in terms of human rights abuses. Having studied, traveled, and worked in all three states over a span of 30 years, the sad fact is that they are all too comparable, both in the suppression of human rights and the failure to enact democratic reforms.

Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank—one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail.

We Count on Your Support. Thank you.

Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). ©2004. All rights reserved.

Subscribe to The Progressive Response!

To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:

To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.org

Simply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above.

The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about US foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to irc@irc-online.org. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.

This page was last modified on Monday, February 9, 2004 12:22 PM
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.

<table width="600" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr valign="top"> <td width="539"><h1 align="left">The Progressive Response</h1> Volume 8, Number 4 February 9, 2004 Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (<a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">IRC</a>) </td> <td width="61"><a href="javascript:openTafWindow('/?action=etfform&url=http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume8/v8n09_body.html','TellAFriend','scrolling=yes,resizable,width=600,height=400')"><img src="../../images/icon_share.gif" width="38" height="27" border="0"></a> <a href="../../form_feedback.html" target="_parent"><img src="../../images/icon_feedback.gif" width="51" height="22" border="0" alt="Give us your feedback"></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><table width="600" cellpadding="5"> <tr> <td colspan="2"><div align="center"><a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">We Count on Your Support!</a></div></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Foreign Policy In Focus</td> <td> <div align="right"><a href="http://www.fpif.org/" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a></div></td> </tr> </table></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <div align="center"></div> <blockquote> <div align="left"> The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_blank">www.irc-online.org</a>) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/</a>, or email <<a href="mailto:feedback@fpif.org">feedback@fpif.org</a>> to share your thoughts with us. John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">www.irc-online.org</a>) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <<a href="mailto:john@irc-online.org">john@irc-online.org</a>>.   </div> </blockquote> <h2>Table of Contents</h2> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#nepal">NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR</a> By Conn Hallinan <a href="#iraqiwomen">IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ</a> By Jim Lobe <a href="#wrong">WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG</a> By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <a href="#unbacking">THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ</a> By Phyllis Bennis <a href="#libyan">LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS</a> By Stephen Zunes <a href="#blair">BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES</a> By Ian Williams </blockquote>   <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#best">THE BEST WE CAN DO</a> <a href="#interesting">VERY INTERESTING</a> </blockquote>   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <a name="nepal" id="nepal"></a>NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR By Conn Hallinan <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402nepal.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402nepal.html</a>). </blockquote> Tucked into the upper stories of the Himalayas, Nepal hardly seems ground zero for the Bush administration's next crusade against “terrorism,” but an aggressive American ambassador, a strategic locale, and a flood of U.S. weaponry threatens to turn the tiny country of 25 million into a counter-insurgency bloodbath. More than 8,000 Nepalese have died since a civil war broke out in 1996, and the death rate has sharply increased with the arrival of almost 8,400 American M-16 submachine guns, accompanied by U.S. advisers, high-tech night fighting equipment, and British helicopters. For most Americans, Nepal, birthplace of the Buddha and home to Everest, the world's highest mountain, is a charming tourist haven. For the native Nepalese, 42% of whom, according to the World Bank, live below the poverty line, Nepal is a land enchained by caste, riven with ethnic rivalries, and dominated by a feudal landlord class. The central protagonists in the current war are King Gyanendra, who abolished an elected parliament last year, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPNM), which is leading a rural insurrection, and a group of five political parties that found themselves out in the cold when the monarchy took over. The Bush administration has concluded that the civil war threatens to make Nepal a “failed state” and a haven for international terrorists, leading it to place the CPNM on the State Department's “Watch List,” along with organizations like al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and Lebanon's Hezbollah. U.S. Ambassador to Nepal, Michael E. Malinowski, compares CPNM leader, Baburam Bhattarai, to Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. Malinowski, whose track record includes service in Afghanistan and Pakistan, advocates an all-out military offensive aimed at the insurgency, and recently told the New York Times that the CPNM, “literally have to be bent back to the table.” But it was the Nepalese government's attempt to crush rural unrest that sparked the civil war in the first place, and virtually no one thinks there is a military solution to the insurrection. “The government forces, under the present policies, could win a couple of battles here and there,” writes analyst Romeet Kaul Watt in The Kashmir Tribune, “but will never win the war.” (Conn Hallinan <a href="mailto:connm@cats.ucsc.edu" target="_blank"><connm@cats.ucsc.edu</a>> is a provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="iraqiwomen" id="iraqiwomen"></a>IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ By Jim Lobe <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html</a>). </blockquote> Iraq's governing council (IGC) has quietly approved a plan to replace some existing legal women's rights with Islamic law or “Shariah,” according to 44 U.S. lawmakers, who warn Washington of a “brewing women's rights crisis” in the U.S.-occupied country. This comes as women are facing broader assaults on women's rights and political power in Iraq. For example, while three women serve on the IGC, only one is in the cabinet and no women serve on the 24-member constitutional committee. One of the three female members of the IGC, a champion of women's rights, was killed this past fall and her replacement is widely viewed as a conservative. According to the Rocky Mountain News, when the adviser on human rights issues for the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, Salwa Ali, tried to be a part of the local elections in Baghdad, she found that the neighborhood was plastered with fliers stating that women were not allowed. In a letter sent to President George W. Bush on February 2, the national political leaders, led by Representatives Carolyn Maloney, Eddie Bernice Johnson, and Darlene Hooley, complain the move will reverse legal guarantees for Iraqi women, who were among the most liberated in the Arab world. “To prevent this order from taking effect, we strongly urge you and your administration to take steps now to protect the rights of Iraqi women,” wrote the lawmakers, who represent both the Republican Party and the Democrats. The White House had no immediate comment. The letter follows earlier reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups critical of the Bush administration's failure to adequately protect women's rights in occupied Iraq. The lawmakers were referring to IGC resolution 137, approved by the 25-member body Dec. 29, which replaces Iraq's 1959 personal-status legislation with religious laws to be administered by clerics from the country's different religious faiths, depending on the sect to which the parties in any dispute belonged. That change could affect everything from the right to education, employment, and freedom of movement, to property inheritance, divorce, and child custody, according to the letter's authors. The resolution must still be approved by the de facto government in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, in order to become legally binding. In a letter to Bremer on Jan. 30 MADRE, a New York-based international rights advocate for women, argued that IGC's action lacked transparency and was taken without any public debate or open consultation, with only a minority of council members present. “In less than 15 minutes of discussions, the IGC--none of whose members were elected by Iraqis--passed Resolution 137, effectively abolishing women's legal rights in 'liberated' Iraq,” said MADRE's associate director, Yifat Susskind. “Under the direct authority of the Bush administration, the IGC has privileged sectarianism over inclusiveness and violated core principles of democratic governance,” she said. Iraqi women are also protesting the resolution, according to recent press reports. “This will send us home and shut the door, just like what happened to women in Afghanistan,” Kurdish lawyer Amira Hassan Abdullah told the Washington Post last month. “The old law wasn't perfect, but this one would make Iraq a jungle. Iraq women will accept it over their dead bodies.” (Jim Lobe is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.) For More Information: MADRE Letter <a href="http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html%20" target="_blank">http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html </a> Paul Wolfowitz, “Women in the New Iraq,” Washington Post, February 1, 2004 <a href="http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html%20" target="_blank">http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html </a> Amnesty International, Iraq's Women: Occupied Territory <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html" target="_blank">http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html</a> Woodrow Wilson Center conference on the role of women in Iraq: <a href="http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266" target="_blank">http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266</a> Open Society Institute, Casualties of War: Iraqi Women's Rights and Reality Then and Now (November 17, 2003) <a href="http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117%20" target="_blank">http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117 </a>   <a name="wrong" id="wrong"></a>WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <blockquote> ( Editor's Note : Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402wrong.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402wrong.html </a>). </blockquote> It may have been fortuitous that David Kay's testimony about U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq came just before the Super Bowl. Watching the game--and the “flash dance” finale of the halftime show--the everyday observer could begin to understand the truth in the caution: “Don't believe everything you think you see.” Or in the case of instant replays, “re-see”--as in, “Did the Patriots really get those few inches and a first down?” David Kay has flatly stated that U.S. and other national intelligence agencies with which the U.S. has close ties essentially got it wrong on Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction. Kay traced the main failure to December 1998. Then the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) looking for weapons, toxic stockpiles, and missile delivery systems since 1991 was forced to withdraw because of the U.S.-UK Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign. Suddenly, the on-the-ground eyes and ears on which the U.S. intelligence community had relied since Operation Desert Storm vanished, leaving only easily spoofed optical and communications “spies in the skies.” Why were so many so wrong for so long? Essentially, because no one could fathom the wheels within wheels that existed within Saddam's inner circle, beginning with Saddam himself. In short, the most basic rule of intelligence--know your opponent--wasn't observed. George Tenet conceded as much in his speech at Georgetown on February 5, 2004 , in which he defended the pre-war performance of U.S. intelligence. And he specifically contradicted David Kay on individual points, leaving the public wondering where the truth lies. The baseline the intelligence agencies seemed to work from rested on two “irrefutable” premises. First, Saddam had produced, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons, had been working on developing a nuclear weapon capability, had produced biological agents, and had surface-to-surface missiles. Second, Saddam knew everything that happened in Iraq and was ruthless when someone crossed him. Flowing from the first premise was the assumption that Iraqis would not adjust to post-1991 realities. These included sanctions and the intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM--and the latter's 2002-2003 successor inspection agency. The second premise carried an implicit assumption that in a rigid, highly centralized society like Iraq , everything would be documented. Thus, the absence of documents detailing destruction of weapons and agents “proved” that large stockpiles still existed somewhere. David Kay said he could find no evidence that the assessments of analysts were influenced by or changed in response to pressure from any official. Given that Vice President Cheney paid multiple visits to CIA headquarters to speak to analysts and that an independent intelligence “unit” created in the Office of the Secretary of Defense fed raw information and its “analysis” directly to the White House, a red flag should have gone up the highest flagpole. Because of these and quite possibly other, unknown, visits and pressures, analysts would be prone to weave into assessments any information supporting their long-held suspicions as a “defense” against the extremist positions (e.g., Saddam is an imminent threat) of Bush administration officials. Similarly, analysts may have omitted the usual caveats to make their case more convincing. But the price of defending a “rational” position resting on old premises was to be so wedded to history that the actual situation, which occasionally was glimpsed, was not even considered to be possible. If Kay is right about the corruption in Iraq and the extent of the deception practiced on Saddam and others in the Baathist and military elites, in effect Iraq was on the verge of becoming a failed state ready to disintegrate at the slightest push. That push came in March 2003, and the resulting and continuing inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, and jihadist carnage attest to the danger Iraq has become to its neighbors as a result of the U.S.-led invasion. (Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org </a>), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)   <a name="unbacking" id="unbacking"></a>THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ By Phyllis Bennis <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new set of Talking Points available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402un.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402un.html</a>). </blockquote> The U.S. is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington 's claim of legitimacy, is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help. Kofi Annan's decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the U.S., but also a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan's announcement indicated he was responding to the request of the U.S. occupation authorities and its hand-picked “governing council” to determine whether elections could be held by Washington's June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader definition of “what alternative arrangement would be acceptable” if not. Why Did the Bush Administration Change Their Line on the UN? 1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the U.S. occupation (especially the continuing deaths and mounting injuries of U.S. soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal power shift within the Bush administration, with the Pentagon ideologues tactically (and almost certainly temporarily) giving way to electorally focused considerations. In the battle between Rumsfeld/Cheney and Karl Rove, the Rumsfeld/Cheney team seems to have blinked first. 2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is Dick Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly refusing to even hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in the face of UN and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed location at all to travel to European capitals urging greater international support for the U.S. in Iraq, even calling on (though only once) the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure on Cheney's longstanding antagonism to multilateralism and the UN. What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Refuses to Return to Iraq Under U.S. Terms? What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Agrees to U.S. Terms? 1) If the UN completely rejects the U.S. proposal that it return to Iraq under the auspices of the U.S. occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating marginalization by the Bush administration, further threats to its independence, and the likelihood of being deemed “irrelevant” by the world's sole super-power. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization and the humanitarian agencies, reduce its already insufficient political support, and increase its threats and punishments of UN member states who stand defiant. 2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the U.S. occupation, the dangers are even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of international credibility, and the danger of being deemed an agent for or facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraq would again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN was acting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed under extreme U.S. pressure, Security Council resolution 1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the U.S. occupation of Iraq; it does not provide any legitimacy. So, What Should Be Done 1) There should be an immediate end to U.S. occupation, and withdrawal of American troops. Because the U.S. invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and undermined security for civilians throughout much of the country, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate for the United Nations, Arab League, and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to provide direct support for Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid (including control over all international funds, including those coming from the U.S. Congress, designated for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment. 2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial U.S.-imposed June 30th deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have to change before an election could be organized, assess what time frame would be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any election conducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair. (Phyllis Bennis <<a href="mailto:pbennis@compuserve.com">pbennis@compuserve.com</a>> is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="libyan"></a>LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS By Stephen Zunes <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../2004/0401libya.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0401libya.html</a>). </blockquote> In a world seemingly gone mad, it is ironic that one of the most sane and reasonable actions to come out of the Middle East recently has emanated from the government of Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator long recognized as an international outlaw. Libya's stunning announcement that it is giving up its nascent biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs and accepting international assistance and verification of its disarmament efforts is a small but important positive step in the struggle to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It would be a big mistake, however, to accept claims by the Bush administration and its supporters that it was the invasion of Iraq and other threatened uses of force against so-called "rogue states" which pursue WMD programs that led to Libya's decision to end its WMD programs. While Saddam Hussein was less than cooperative with United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) efforts in the 1990s, it appears that they were successful in ridding the country of its chemical and biological weapons and related facilities. The Iraqi regime was more cooperative during that period with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the IAEA announcing in 1998 that Iraq's nuclear program had been completely dismantled. When IAEA inspectors returned in the fall of 2002 as part of UN Security Council resolution 1441, they reported that no signs that the program had been revived. Iraq also allowed the return of a revived and strengthened inspections regime for chemical and biological weapons systems (known as UNMOVIC) at that time, which also found no evidence of any proscribed weapons or weapons programs. Despite this, the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew the government. As a result, Libya presumably knows that unilateral disarmament and allowing UN inspectors does not necessarily make you less safe from a possible U.S. invasion. More likely, Libya simply recognized that they would not get anything worthwhile as a result of continuing with an expensive, dangerous, and complex process of weapons development and would instead continue to face international isolation and difficulty obtaining certain dual-use technologies which could enhance the country's economic development. (Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org</a>) and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (online at <a href="http://www.commoncouragepress.com" target="_blank">www.commoncouragepress.com</a>).)   <a name="blair"></a>BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES By Ian Williams <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402blair.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402blair.html</a>). </blockquote> On the face of it, Tony Blair had an almost Clintonesque week as he walked away from two separate train wrecks seemingly unhurt. However, beneath the surface, there are deep internal injuries that have left him seriously weakened. His escape on the University fees issue by the tiniest handful of defections among Labor rebels was only contrived by Gordon Brown exercising his influence on some of the more prominent of them. Brown is preparing the ground for a “more in sorrow than in anger” replacement of an unelectable Blair before the next elections. He has pre-emptively cleared himself of disloyalty by acting as the, strictly temporary, king-saver. The leadership conflict in the Labor Party has been brought forward all the more sharply by the other “victory,” the Hutton Report. The Law Lord may have done British Prime Minister Tony Blair no favors at all, since public opinion overwhelmingly sees the report as a whitewash, and thus that the government has something to hide. Even the Report's attack on the integrity of the BBC has backfired. Three times as many British people polled trusted the BBC as compared to trusting the government. Indeed almost the only supporters the government and the Report had were the Murdoch press, the Sun and Times. And even their readers may wonder whether a media empire that has never allowed the truth to interfere with the smooth flow of proprietary prejudices really has the proper standing to attack the BBC's journalistic standards. There was a germ of truth in some of the Report's criticisms of the BBC's journalism. Ironically, under Thatcherite and New Labor pressures, it has relaxed its previous standards. The news is no longer scripted and read, based on “balance,” airing both sides. The good aspect is that, even though nominally a state-owned body, it has proved far more skeptical of the government than its privately owned counterparts in the USA. But if Andrew Gilligan had but just a shade more balance and qualifications in his initial report, as in fact he did in later versions, then he would not have left the Achilles Heel that Blair's media minders and Hutton got a noose into. Without some admission on his part, the public has to decide whether the Prime Minister was sincere, but either misled or stupid. Or he could have been so desperate to please George W. Bush that he persuaded himself that more evidence actually existed than there really was. Or he was so mendacious, that to conceal his real agenda of regime change, he marshaled a set of excuses that later failed. None of these positions actually strengthen his position, so he may follow the example of the BBC's bosses and do the honorable thing. Resign before the election. But like them, he will need a shove. Brown is waiting. (Ian Williams <<a href="mailto:uswarreport@igc.org">uswarreport@igc.org</a>> contributes frequently to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>) on UN and international affairs.)   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <a name="best" id="best"></a>THE BEST WE CAN DO Re: <a href="../..papers/03petropol/development.html">The Global Record on Oil</a> The best we European and American would do to end the waste of oil is to build smaller cars, go by bike, walk or take public transport electrically driven. And instead of spending money for exploring the Mars, we better invent electrically driven cars and use Earth Energy. And airplanes are, sorry to say, vehicles of the last century. Consumer must change their habits, above all. - Edwin Wagner, <a href="mailto:aewagth72@bluewin.ch"><aewagth72@bluewin.ch></a> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- <a name="interesting"></a>VERY INTERESTING Re: <a href="../../commentary/2003/0305roh.html" target="_parent">Eyes on Different Prizes </a> I found this article to be very interesting. Although I am young, I do have an interest in what happens in our world and how we would go about dealing with those issues. What I thought was the most interesting about this article was that how the U.S. and N. Korea have different goals set in my mind, I am pleased to hear that N. Korea abd S. Korea are working on their peace issues, and how we are building a better relationship then the one that we have with S. Korea already. Things obviously get rough but through our efforts and our patience we can get it all worked out. And with this article I think that's what we are doing with our best abilities. - Tina Dickerson, <a href="mailto:Wolfsreign@Wapda.com"><Wolfsreign@Wapda.com</a>>   <hr size="1" noshade> Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank&#151one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on <a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm</a> to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail. We Count on Your Support. Thank you. <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent"><img src="../../images/icon_fpif_25.jpg" width="113" height="38" border="0" alt="Back to FPIF homepage"></a> Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">www.irc-online.org</a>) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at <a href="http://www.ips-dc.org/" target="_blank">www.ips-dc.org</a>). ©2004. All rights reserved. <hr noshade size="1"> <h3 align="center"><a name="subscribe"></a>Subscribe to The Progressive Response!</h3> <blockquote> To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to: <script language="javascript" src="/all_sites/email.js"></script><form name="subscribe_form" method="post" action="http://www.irc-online.org/lists/subscribe" onSubmit="return valid_list_signup(this);"><input name="email" type="text" value="(enter your email address)" size="30" onFocus="enter_email(this);"><input type="hidden" name="action" value="subscribe"> <input type="hidden" name="group" value="17"><input type="submit" name="btn_submit" value="Subscribe"></form> To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to: <a href="mailto:list-unsubscribe@irc-online.org">lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.org</a> Simply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above. </blockquote>   The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about US foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to <a href="mailto:irc@irc-online.org">irc@irc-online.org</a>. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.   This page was last modified on Monday, February 9, 2004 1:51 PM Contact the <a href="mailto:web@fpif.org">IRC's webmaster</a> with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website. Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved. </td> </tr> </table>