The Progressive Response

Volume 8, Number 10
April 2, 2004

Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)

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Foreign Policy In Focus	www.fpif.org

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

I. Updates and Out-Takes

THE EVANGELICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN UNILATERALISM: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S INFLUENCE AND HOW TO COUNTER IT
By Duane Oldfield

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVENTH MAJLIS ELECTIONS IN IRAN
By Christopher Boucek

ANTI-TERRORIST SECURITY SWEEP IN PAKISTAN WINDING DOWN
By Abubaker Saddique

PARADIGM SHIFT OR PARADIGM TWIST? THE IMPACT OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE ON CANADA
By Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda

LONG LIVE NATO
By Tom Barry

II. Letters and Comments

WAIT A MINUTE

RESPONSE BY JULIE MERTUS

I. Updates and Out-Takes

THE EVANGELICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN UNILATERALISM: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S INFLUENCE AND HOW TO COUNTER IT
By Duane Oldfield

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new special report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004evangelical.html .)

That the administration of George W. Bush is pursuing a unilateralist foreign policy on issues ranging from the Iraq War to global warming to the International Criminal Court is obvious to observers at home and abroad. Also clear is the fact that the Bush policy, at least in its broad outlines, is very much in keeping with the preferences of the Christian right. President Bush, himself a born-again Christian, does not hesitate to use a moralistic, implicitly religious language in defense of his policies.

What, exactly, is the relationship between the Christian right and the unilateralist foreign policy of the present administration? For the last quarter century, the Christian right has been a key player regarding domestic social issues such as abortion, gay rights, and prayer in schools. While journalists, politicians, and academics continue to analyze and debate the Christian right's effectiveness in these areas, less attention has been paid to the religious right's influence on American foreign policy. However, that influence is becoming difficult to ignore and is in need of further analysis.

How should progressives understand and respond to the Christian right's foreign policy influence? One of the most common approaches adopted by opponents of the Christian right and its predecessors has invoked the language of extremism. Extremists, such as members of the radical right, are seen as distinct from the reasonable world of normal or mainstream politics. They are viewed as irrational, psychologically disturbed people who do not accept the rules of the democratic game. This approach has a long, intellectual history from Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Richard Hofstadter's analyses of McCarthyism and the John Birch Society to later interpretations of the Christian right. Although this approach has been much criticized by academics, it is the analysis that guides major lobbying groups that attempt to counter the Christian right.

The extremism approach has particular dangers for those critiquing the Christian right from the left. The analysis of extremism is inherently one that upholds the “responsible” center against both extremes. Pitting a rational center against irrational extremists also blinds everyone to the irrationality of the center and the rationality of the extremes.

It is a serious mistake to think that the extremes of the Christian right are the only places where dangerous nationalist myths take root. The ideology of American unilateralism draws on a variety of sources from mainstream popular culture and civil religion.

Finally, and most importantly, the Christian right is no longer an extreme separate from the foreign policy mainstream. Seeing the Christian right as an extreme fringe element that has somehow wormed itself into the realm of responsible mainstream foreign policymaking is simply mistaken. With its grassroots strength, the Christian right is a major component in the electoral coalition of the country's dominant political party. It enjoys close relations with the president and his neoconservative advisers, and, for the moment at least, the Christian right is a significant element in a unilateralist alliance that dominates American foreign policy. This stature must be taken into account by those who would attempt to counter the influence of the religious right.

If the Christian right is part of a dominant foreign policy alliance, how should those who oppose it proceed? I would suggest that those looking to organize against the Christian right, and the unilateralist alliance of which it is a part, begin by examining the inherent tensions and contradictions within that alliance and within the Christian right itself, such as on issues of globalization, religious persecution, and tension with its partners within the increasingly global alliance of social conservatives.

Progressive internationalism, i.e., utilizing international institutions to promote equitable economic development rather than neoliberalism, poses serious problems for the Christian right's attempts to construct a global alliance of social conservatives and undercuts the unilateral American nationalism of the Christian right. Few of the Christian right's potential allies in other parts of the world are fervent American nationalists, and they are generally more favorably inclined toward the UN.

Moreover, a progressive international economic agenda highlights real contradictions between the neoliberalism of the current administration, with which the Christian right is allied, and the economic interests of prospective third world allies that the Christian right is attempting to win over on social issues.

Shifting the global social conservatism debate to an agenda of progressive internationalism, translating concerns over religious persecution into commitment to a general defense of human rights, and countering economic globalization are obviously not easy tasks. However, if done correctly, pursuit of such goals can trigger a win/win scenario: it's the right thing to do, and it could create serious problems for the Christian right and the unilateralist alliance now dominating American foreign policy.

(Duane Oldfield is an associate professor of political science at Knox College and the author of The Right and the Righteous (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2003.)

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVENTH MAJLIS ELECTIONS IN IRAN
By Christopher Boucek

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403iran.html .)

On February 20 th Iran elected its seventh Majlis (parliament) in an election that has been widely criticized by many Iranian and international observers for the heavy-handed manner in which the regime had interfered in the electoral process. The conservative Council of Guardians disqualified an estimated 2,500 candidates from standing for election--by some counts nearly four times the number of barred candidates in the 2000 Majlis elections. As a result, Iran 's conservative factions recaptured control of the Majlis at the expense of the reformist movement associated with President Mohammad Khatami. The political discourse within Iranian domestic politics has thus been re-centered within the conservative camp.

Among those initially disqualified were several leading figures within the reformist movement, many currently serving in the Majlis and among the largest vote earners in the previous elections four years ago. In all, over 80 currently serving MPs were barred from participating. First Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Khatami--the president's brother and leader of the Participation Front--as well as Behzad Nabavi, Mohsen Mirdamadi, and Mohsen Armin, among many others, were disqualified by the hard-line Guardian Council. These moderate MPs served on some of the most important Majlis committees, including Foreign Affairs, National Security, and Judicial Affairs, and their disqualification marks a significant setback for the moderate elements in Iranian politics. With the reformists removed from the Majlis--and President Khatami's authority weakened as a result of the showdown--many observers have argued that Iranian politics have taken a decisive shift to the right, however this proves to be a very cursory analysis, and neglects to consider the extremely Byzantine nature of the emerging political order in Teheran.

In the seven years since Khatami's presidential victory, Iran's reformers appeared to many to have seized control of Iran's future, and set the Islamic Republic on the course of moderation. However the tenure of the reformists has produced few benefits for the people. The powerful, hard-line conservatives within the regime--unelected and deeply rooted in the system, especially within the judiciary and the Guardian Council--have repeatedly blocked any implementation of the moderates' agenda. Khatami's presidency has been marred by numerous press closures and confrontations over the limits of free expression, repeated legal tribulations for many leading reformists, and the extremely violent 1999 student democracy uprisings.

Thus, heading into February's elections many segments of the Iranian electorate felt betrayed by the reformists and their failures to enact their platforms. Many Iranian voters felt resigned to a conservative victory. As a result, relatively few voters actually turned out to participate in the Majlis elections. This widespread voter apathy was not just an admission of an unfair election, but rather a way for the electorate to vote “no confidence” in the system.

the effective non-participation of much of the electorate is in fact the only way many voters can convey to the clerical regime that things must change. Voters opted not to legitimize a contest that had little bearing on their own affairs, and quite honestly for many, it matters little who sits in the Majlis, conservative or moderate. By withholding their vote, they have sent a message to the conservatives that this is not simply business as usual. In the course of this latest parliamentary election, Iran has moved from being a semi-democracy--the envy of several of its neighbors--to being even closer identified as a regime ruled by an increasingly diminishing minority out of step with the people.

Iranian domestic politics are now set for a showdown for supremacy within the conservative camp; as with any political grouping, Iran's conservatives do not represent one unified block. The two main wings of the conservative movement, represented by the pragmatic, educated, professional--“moderate realists ”--technocrats identified with former president and chairman of the Expediency Council Hashemi Rafsanjani, versus the absolutist, fundamentalist ideologues and strict social conservatives intent on living in the shadow of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

This struggle will determine the future of the Islamic Republic and its policies. Teheran's nuclear program, Iran's role in the region, its Afghan and Iraq policies, its relations with the west and the United States will ultimately be decided as a result of this struggle. The Rafsanjani-style pragmatists have clear advantages in this contest. Under his tutelage, the Expediency Council has taken on significant strategic policy planning in addition to its legislative oversight duties. It is important to recognize how Rafsanjani and his coterie have both kept an ear to the realities of the international system while simultaneously being dutiful servants of the Revolution. What remains to be seen is whether this conservative faction will face the same obstructions that it did during Rafsanjani's presidency when several of his pragmatic policies fell victim to battles with the hard-line hezbollahi ideologues.

(Christopher Boucek is the editor of the Homeland Security & Resilience Monitor at the Royal United Services Institute in London. He has just returned from his second trip to Iran in as many months. He wrote this for Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org).)

ANTI-TERRORIST SECURITY SWEEP IN PAKISTAN WINDING DOWN
By Abubaker Saddique

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403paki.html .)

Pakistan’s government on March 30 began pulling troops out of South Waziristan following a 12-day security sweep of the area to root out Taliban and al Qaeda militants. The withdrawal was accompanied by an official admission that no Islamic radical leaders had been killed during the operation, as was earlier claimed.

According to military sources, over 60 Islamic militants and 46 government troops were killed during the South Waziristan security sweep. Approximately 160 militants were also taken prisoner.

On March 29, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, the chief spokesman for the Pakistani military, announced that the operation had succeeded in killing al Qaeda’s chief of intelligence, an individual identified only as Abdullah. Sultan added that the "No. 10" leader of al Qaeda, Tahir Yuldashev, who is also the political leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, had been seriously wounded, but had escaped a military dragnet.

Sultan went on to describe the security sweep as a success. The "relatively high casualties was a small price for the lofty cause of eliminating terrorism from Pakistani territory," the general said at a Foreign Ministry news conference.

On March 30, Sultan was forced to make an embarrassing revision of the previous day’s assertion, saying that Abdullah was not a member of the al Qaeda hierarchy, but instead a relatively minor operative in the terrorist organization. While the military was downgrading its profile in South Waziristan, which straddles the Pakistani frontier with Afghanistan, Sultan indicated that troops would maintain a presence in the region until it was completely "purged" of foreign militants.

Islamic political parties in Pakistan strongly resent the operation. The six-party Islamist coalition--the United Council for Action, which runs the provincial government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP)--on March 26 staged a coordinated protest action against the security sweep.

Some Pakistani political observers questioned the government’s contention that the mission was a success, pointing to the fact that a relatively tiny number of Islamic militants were either captured or killed. At the same time, the militants’ stiff resistance appeared to demoralize Pakistani troops. The most notorious incident of the entire operation occurred March 26, when militants executed eight government soldiers who had earlier been taken hostage.

The United States in recent weeks has beefed up its military forces in Afghanistan, especially in Paktia, Khost, and Paktika provinces, along the Pakistani border. These troops were reportedly in position to trap Islamic militants who tried to cross the border to evade the pressure coming from Pakistani forces on the other side of the frontier.

(Abubaker Saddique reports on South Central Asia for Eurasianet (www.eurasianet.org). This was reprinted with permission by Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org).)

PARADIGM SHIFT OR PARADIGM TWIST? THE IMPACT OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE ON CANADA
By Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new special report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004canada.html .)

Many aspects of the catastrophe that struck the United States on September 11, 2001 were not novel. Terrorism was as old as the perception of political oppression by the militantly aggrieved, and global terrorism had been a reality for two decades. Even global terrorism aiming at American targets was well established. What was new about the attacks was the United States' humiliation at having its own civilian airplanes used as missiles guided by Osama bin-Laden's adepts who were admitted to the country by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), having slipped through the fingers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and then trained at free-enterprise flying schools without the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) managing to understand what was being perpetrated.

The incineration of New York's World Trade Center (site of American global financial power), the destruction at the Pentagon (headquarters for American global military might), and the near miss on Congress or the White House (control centers of American global hegemony) were not just a feat whose symbolism reverberated in all corners of the earth. More important for our concerns in this chapter, the attacks had a transformative impact on the American public who finally realized that even the United States was vulnerable to the darker sides of globalization.

The resulting seismic shift in Americans' consciousness presented the Bush administration with the opportunity to effect a radical shift in the U.S. government's policy hierarchy. Having spent eight months since his installation as president of the United States without a clear plan to implement his conservative beliefs, George W. Bush was suddenly handed a rationale with which to justify bolstering the state's coercive and police power at home and to remilitarize American policy abroad. With national security legitimating its unilateralist proclivities under the slogan of a war against terrorism, a fervently neoconservative White House “found a threat and built a world order around it.”

The Bush administration's shift from economic liberalization to national security was shrewdly conceived, deftly executed, masterfully marketed, and overwhelmingly popular. But unlike previous paradigm shifts such as the move to Keynesianism half a century before, it was far from stable. National security rapidly passed through three variants, focused successively on prevention, building up domestic counter-terrorism (homeland security measures taken after September 11, 2001) retribution, legitimizing diplomatically sanctioned military force (intervention to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan) pre-emption, implementing the unilateralist Bush Doctrine (war to achieve regime change in Iraq).

The World Trade Center attacks ended the continent-wide conception of policy priorities and U.S.-centered bilateralism took over. The re-emergence of an assertive, militarized U.S. hegemony forced continental governance into retreat. North American economic integration--and the whole project of continental governance--remained a creature of its constituent states.

Given Mexico's preference for multilateral-bilateralism and Canada's traditional counterweight strategy, this third dyad could become increasingly important as a complement to each periphery's vital U.S. relationship and so provide NAFTA with an intergovernmental--if not institutionalized or supranational--base to diffuse American preponderance through solidarity of the weak.

If another leap forward is to follow the failed trilateralism and revived bilateralism resulting from Ground Zero--a kind of reculer pour mieux sauter--the three states of North America will need to achieve some consensus on their respective policy hierarchies. Paradigm congruence could occur if Washington realigned its policy set with Ottawa's and Mexico City's, a possibility that would have to await regime change in Washington. If the Bush Doctrine continues to provide the script for a continuingly aggressive global unilateralism unacceptable both to Mexicans and Canadians, then the peripheries' capacity to develop independent policy sets could perpetuate lasting paradigm conflict.

If the price for further integration is satisfying Washington about its security, big business will readily accept whatever schemes are thought necessary, but the public might not. Such a split is certain to complicate Prime Minister Paul Martin's life. The integrationist Canadian business community that financed his leadership aspirations may want to enact every type of continental accommodation from customs and currency union to continental security perimeter and armed services' integration. But the values and attitudes of the Canadian public are diverging from those of their American neighbors, so Martin's integrationist proclivities will have to be contained lest they jeopardize his party's electoral chances.

With such dim prospects for continental convergence, the likelihood of a new dawning of continental paradigm stability is even dimmer. The source of paradigm turbulence was the radicalism of the Republican party's Washington leadership and the institutional primacy of a militant Pentagon and White House. The domestically polarizing effects of the Bush Republicans' radical global agenda have prevented the kind of paradigm entrenchment that depends on a bipartisan consensus about its basic assumptions. The combination of paradigm instability at the center and paradigm dissonance with its periphery suggested that the post-September 11 future of continental governance for North America was far from rosy.

(Stephen Clarkson is a Professor of Political Science and Maria Banda is completing her B.A. in international relations at the University of Toronto. This special report from Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org) was originally presented at the conference at York University entitled Canada, Free Trade and Deep Integration in North America: Revitalizing Democracy, Upholding the Public Good, October 14-16, 2003 sponsored by the The Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean at York University and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. This special report will appear in Ricardo Grinspun (ed.), The Slippery Slope: Canada Free Trade and Deep Integration in North America, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, forthcoming).)

LONG LIVE NATO
By Tom Barry

(Editor’s Note: With the recent NATO expansion, it is useful to look at one of the few alliances the Bush administration is actually enthusiastic about. This piece, excerpted below (and available in full at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/analysis/2004/0404nato.php) is from the IRC’s Right Web project.)

Seven more nations are joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and three more Central European nations have their applications pending. Although the Bush administration has set an overall course in foreign and military policy of treaty-breaking and unilateralism, it remains a strong proponent of NATO expansion.

Founded in 1949 as a security buffer against the Soviet Union, NATO has not only survived the end of the cold war. It is flourishing. Despite criticism that a post-cold war NATO would unnecessarily propagate the West-East security divide that shaped international relations for the four decades of the cold war, the U.S. government has led the drive to energize and expand NATO. In 1999, after contentious debate in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. approved the accession of Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. Leading the NATO enlargement lobby was the neoconservative Committee to Expand NATO, which brought together several prominent neocons now serving in the Bush administration, along with conservative Democrats such as Will Marshall of the Progressive Policy Institute and the Democratic Leadership Council.

After succeeding in advancing the first post-cold war round of enlargement, the Committee to Expand NATO (renamed U.S. Committee on NATO) launched its “Big Bang” strategy to bring ten more nations into the NATO fold. After an initial meeting of the ten new prospects in Vilnius, Lithuania, with the aid of the U.S. Committee on NATO the so-called Vilnius Group began pressuring Washington and NATO headquarters for membership.

Among the first board members of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO were Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Peter Rodman, and Stephen Hadley, all of whom later joined the Bush administration. All of these neocons were associates of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Bruce Jackson sits on the five-member board of PNAC. Randy Scheunemann, who was an officer of the NATO expansion committee, is also a PNAC board member. Both Jackson and Scheunemann were cofounders of the Project on Transitional Democracies, which continues to work with the countries of New Europe to foster economic and military ties with the United States.

The U.S. Committee on NATO was not, however, purely a neocon venture. It reached out to and included Democrats such as Will Marshall, founder and president of the Progressive Policy Institute. Marshall was also a founder of the Democratic Leadership Council, another organization of “New Democrats.” In 2002 Marshall also joined the advisory committee to the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, a bipartisan pro-war group founded by Jackson at the urging of the Bush administration.

NATO expansion cannot be written off as a neocon conspiracy. But neither should one assume that the neoconservatives are so dismissive of the “appeasers” in Europe and so preoccupied with the Middle East (and especially the security of Israel) that they don’t have a grand strategy for a restructured Europe. “Strengthen America, Secure Europe. Defend Values. Expand NATO” was the motto of the U.S. Committee on NATO. The committee's slogan concisely summarizes the main arguments of the NATO expansion lobby in the United States.

In the estimation of John Laughland, a trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group and a close observer of Jackson's proconsul operations in Eastern Europe: “Far from promoting democracy in eastern Europe, Washington is promoting a system of political and military control not unlike that once practiced by the Soviet Union. Unlike that empire, which collapsed because the center was weaker than the periphery, the new NATO is both a mechanism for extracting Danegeld [tribute levied to support Danish invaders in medieval England] from new member states for the benefit of the U.S. arms industry and an instrument for getting others to protect U.S. interests around the world, including the supply of primary resources such as oil.”

(Tom Barry is Policy Director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), online at www.irc-online.org.)

II. Letters and Comments

WAIT A MINUTE

Re: Bait and Switch? Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy

Julie Mertus takes on the Bush administration for "talking the talk" of human rights but not "walking the walk." Wait a minute. Except for congressionally mandated reports and specific issues targeted for appeal to constituents on the political right, the Bush administration does not even appear to be "talking the talk" in U.S. foreign policy. A careful review of President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy (which advanced the doctrine of preventive military action) reveals that the longstanding concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been replaced by a less specific attachment to "human dignity." In a recent article in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004), Secretary Powell doesn't even mention human rights as a guiding value for the administration's vision, though he does give a quick nod to "human dignity."

For what it is worth, the Clinton administration did make human rights a main consideration in their 2000 National Security Strategy, including "adherence to universal human rights principles" as one of the main headings. An interagency working group on international human rights treaties was set up in the National Security Council, but that subcommittee was abolished by the Bush administration, subsumed under a larger committee looking at international operations.

This administration likes to speak about "freedoms," but too often the freedoms they have in mind is the freedom to shop and invest--not the civil, political, social, or economic rights recognized in international human rights treaties.

No American president has put international human rights front and center of U.S. foreign policy, and that has left all of them open to criticism and even charges of hypocrisy when actions haven't matched the rhetoric. But since the 1950s--when Senator John Bricker and states' rights activists saw to it that the U.S. withdrew support from international human rights treaties--no president has done more than George W. Bush to distance himself from international human rights norms, and to de-link U.S. foreign policy from the attachment to human rights. As in so many other areas, this administration has conducted a stealth attack on the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and it is important not to let that slip by without notice. There is a difference, and it matters.

- Susan Waltz <swaltz@umich.edu>

RESPONSE BY JULIE MERTUS

I am in complete agreement with Susan Waltz’s comment. In writing that the Bush administration "talks the talk" but does not "walk the walk" on human rights, I was using a popular expression, yet I did not mean that the Bush administration is guided by a vision of human rights. As I have written in detail in other articles and in my book Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, I am also troubled by the White House’s attempt to downplay human rights by touting a watery and selective notion of "human dignity."

This administration’s National Security Strategy defines the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" as consisting of: "the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property." The eclectic list is wholly divorced from any that has ever appeared in international human rights instruments.

The listing omits nearly all of the human rights deemed "non-derogable" in international human rights treaties (and, thus, not subject to any exceptions such as national emergency or necessity), including the right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from slavery. The single item that is elevated to a higher status than that recognized in international human rights law is the right to property.

Where does the document’s definition of human dignity come from? From the Bush administration’s understanding of "American values" as reflected in the American Constitution and the president’s sense of divine providence.

Waltz is right--no American president has put human rights front and center--but this president’s attempt to supplant human rights with his own notion of human dignity is different and Professor Waltz is absolutely correct to point out that the difference matters.

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<table width="600" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr valign="top"> <td width="539"><h1 align="left">The Progressive Response</h1> Volume 8, Number 4 February 9, 2004 Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (<a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">IRC</a>) </td> <td width="61"><a href="javascript:openTafWindow('/?action=etfform&url=http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume8/v8n10_body.html','TellAFriend','scrolling=yes,resizable,width=600,height=400')"><img src="../../images/icon_share.gif" width="38" height="27" border="0"></a> <a href="../../form_feedback.html" target="_parent"><img src="../../images/icon_feedback.gif" width="51" height="22" border="0" alt="Give us your feedback"></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><table width="600" cellpadding="5"> <tr> <td colspan="2"><div align="center"><a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">We Count on Your Support!</a></div></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Foreign Policy In Focus</td> <td> <div align="right"><a href="http://www.fpif.org/" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a></div></td> </tr> </table></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <div align="center"></div> <blockquote> <div align="left"> The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_blank">www.irc-online.org</a>) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/</a>, or email <<a href="mailto:feedback@fpif.org">feedback@fpif.org</a>> to share your thoughts with us. John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">www.irc-online.org</a>) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <<a href="mailto:john@irc-online.org">john@irc-online.org</a>>.   </div> </blockquote> <h2>Table of Contents</h2> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#nepal">NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR</a> By Conn Hallinan <a href="#iraqiwomen">IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ</a> By Jim Lobe <a href="#wrong">WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG</a> By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <a href="#unbacking">THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ</a> By Phyllis Bennis <a href="#libyan">LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS</a> By Stephen Zunes <a href="#blair">BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES</a> By Ian Williams </blockquote>   <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#best">THE BEST WE CAN DO</a> <a href="#interesting">VERY INTERESTING</a> </blockquote>   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <a name="nepal" id="nepal"></a>NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR By Conn Hallinan <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402nepal.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402nepal.html</a>). </blockquote> Tucked into the upper stories of the Himalayas, Nepal hardly seems ground zero for the Bush administration's next crusade against “terrorism,” but an aggressive American ambassador, a strategic locale, and a flood of U.S. weaponry threatens to turn the tiny country of 25 million into a counter-insurgency bloodbath. More than 8,000 Nepalese have died since a civil war broke out in 1996, and the death rate has sharply increased with the arrival of almost 8,400 American M-16 submachine guns, accompanied by U.S. advisers, high-tech night fighting equipment, and British helicopters. For most Americans, Nepal, birthplace of the Buddha and home to Everest, the world's highest mountain, is a charming tourist haven. For the native Nepalese, 42% of whom, according to the World Bank, live below the poverty line, Nepal is a land enchained by caste, riven with ethnic rivalries, and dominated by a feudal landlord class. The central protagonists in the current war are King Gyanendra, who abolished an elected parliament last year, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPNM), which is leading a rural insurrection, and a group of five political parties that found themselves out in the cold when the monarchy took over. The Bush administration has concluded that the civil war threatens to make Nepal a “failed state” and a haven for international terrorists, leading it to place the CPNM on the State Department's “Watch List,” along with organizations like al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and Lebanon's Hezbollah. U.S. Ambassador to Nepal, Michael E. Malinowski, compares CPNM leader, Baburam Bhattarai, to Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. Malinowski, whose track record includes service in Afghanistan and Pakistan, advocates an all-out military offensive aimed at the insurgency, and recently told the New York Times that the CPNM, “literally have to be bent back to the table.” But it was the Nepalese government's attempt to crush rural unrest that sparked the civil war in the first place, and virtually no one thinks there is a military solution to the insurrection. “The government forces, under the present policies, could win a couple of battles here and there,” writes analyst Romeet Kaul Watt in The Kashmir Tribune, “but will never win the war.” (Conn Hallinan <a href="mailto:connm@cats.ucsc.edu" target="_blank"><connm@cats.ucsc.edu</a>> is a provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="iraqiwomen" id="iraqiwomen"></a>IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ By Jim Lobe <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html</a>). </blockquote> Iraq's governing council (IGC) has quietly approved a plan to replace some existing legal women's rights with Islamic law or “Shariah,” according to 44 U.S. lawmakers, who warn Washington of a “brewing women's rights crisis” in the U.S.-occupied country. This comes as women are facing broader assaults on women's rights and political power in Iraq. For example, while three women serve on the IGC, only one is in the cabinet and no women serve on the 24-member constitutional committee. One of the three female members of the IGC, a champion of women's rights, was killed this past fall and her replacement is widely viewed as a conservative. According to the Rocky Mountain News, when the adviser on human rights issues for the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, Salwa Ali, tried to be a part of the local elections in Baghdad, she found that the neighborhood was plastered with fliers stating that women were not allowed. In a letter sent to President George W. Bush on February 2, the national political leaders, led by Representatives Carolyn Maloney, Eddie Bernice Johnson, and Darlene Hooley, complain the move will reverse legal guarantees for Iraqi women, who were among the most liberated in the Arab world. “To prevent this order from taking effect, we strongly urge you and your administration to take steps now to protect the rights of Iraqi women,” wrote the lawmakers, who represent both the Republican Party and the Democrats. The White House had no immediate comment. The letter follows earlier reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups critical of the Bush administration's failure to adequately protect women's rights in occupied Iraq. The lawmakers were referring to IGC resolution 137, approved by the 25-member body Dec. 29, which replaces Iraq's 1959 personal-status legislation with religious laws to be administered by clerics from the country's different religious faiths, depending on the sect to which the parties in any dispute belonged. That change could affect everything from the right to education, employment, and freedom of movement, to property inheritance, divorce, and child custody, according to the letter's authors. The resolution must still be approved by the de facto government in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, in order to become legally binding. In a letter to Bremer on Jan. 30 MADRE, a New York-based international rights advocate for women, argued that IGC's action lacked transparency and was taken without any public debate or open consultation, with only a minority of council members present. “In less than 15 minutes of discussions, the IGC--none of whose members were elected by Iraqis--passed Resolution 137, effectively abolishing women's legal rights in 'liberated' Iraq,” said MADRE's associate director, Yifat Susskind. “Under the direct authority of the Bush administration, the IGC has privileged sectarianism over inclusiveness and violated core principles of democratic governance,” she said. Iraqi women are also protesting the resolution, according to recent press reports. “This will send us home and shut the door, just like what happened to women in Afghanistan,” Kurdish lawyer Amira Hassan Abdullah told the Washington Post last month. “The old law wasn't perfect, but this one would make Iraq a jungle. Iraq women will accept it over their dead bodies.” (Jim Lobe is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.) For More Information: MADRE Letter <a href="http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html%20" target="_blank">http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html </a> Paul Wolfowitz, “Women in the New Iraq,” Washington Post, February 1, 2004 <a href="http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html%20" target="_blank">http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html </a> Amnesty International, Iraq's Women: Occupied Territory <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html" target="_blank">http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html</a> Woodrow Wilson Center conference on the role of women in Iraq: <a href="http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266" target="_blank">http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266</a> Open Society Institute, Casualties of War: Iraqi Women's Rights and Reality Then and Now (November 17, 2003) <a href="http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117%20" target="_blank">http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117 </a>   <a name="wrong" id="wrong"></a>WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <blockquote> ( Editor's Note : Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402wrong.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402wrong.html </a>). </blockquote> It may have been fortuitous that David Kay's testimony about U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq came just before the Super Bowl. Watching the game--and the “flash dance” finale of the halftime show--the everyday observer could begin to understand the truth in the caution: “Don't believe everything you think you see.” Or in the case of instant replays, “re-see”--as in, “Did the Patriots really get those few inches and a first down?” David Kay has flatly stated that U.S. and other national intelligence agencies with which the U.S. has close ties essentially got it wrong on Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction. Kay traced the main failure to December 1998. Then the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) looking for weapons, toxic stockpiles, and missile delivery systems since 1991 was forced to withdraw because of the U.S.-UK Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign. Suddenly, the on-the-ground eyes and ears on which the U.S. intelligence community had relied since Operation Desert Storm vanished, leaving only easily spoofed optical and communications “spies in the skies.” Why were so many so wrong for so long? Essentially, because no one could fathom the wheels within wheels that existed within Saddam's inner circle, beginning with Saddam himself. In short, the most basic rule of intelligence--know your opponent--wasn't observed. George Tenet conceded as much in his speech at Georgetown on February 5, 2004 , in which he defended the pre-war performance of U.S. intelligence. And he specifically contradicted David Kay on individual points, leaving the public wondering where the truth lies. The baseline the intelligence agencies seemed to work from rested on two “irrefutable” premises. First, Saddam had produced, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons, had been working on developing a nuclear weapon capability, had produced biological agents, and had surface-to-surface missiles. Second, Saddam knew everything that happened in Iraq and was ruthless when someone crossed him. Flowing from the first premise was the assumption that Iraqis would not adjust to post-1991 realities. These included sanctions and the intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM--and the latter's 2002-2003 successor inspection agency. The second premise carried an implicit assumption that in a rigid, highly centralized society like Iraq , everything would be documented. Thus, the absence of documents detailing destruction of weapons and agents “proved” that large stockpiles still existed somewhere. David Kay said he could find no evidence that the assessments of analysts were influenced by or changed in response to pressure from any official. Given that Vice President Cheney paid multiple visits to CIA headquarters to speak to analysts and that an independent intelligence “unit” created in the Office of the Secretary of Defense fed raw information and its “analysis” directly to the White House, a red flag should have gone up the highest flagpole. Because of these and quite possibly other, unknown, visits and pressures, analysts would be prone to weave into assessments any information supporting their long-held suspicions as a “defense” against the extremist positions (e.g., Saddam is an imminent threat) of Bush administration officials. Similarly, analysts may have omitted the usual caveats to make their case more convincing. But the price of defending a “rational” position resting on old premises was to be so wedded to history that the actual situation, which occasionally was glimpsed, was not even considered to be possible. If Kay is right about the corruption in Iraq and the extent of the deception practiced on Saddam and others in the Baathist and military elites, in effect Iraq was on the verge of becoming a failed state ready to disintegrate at the slightest push. That push came in March 2003, and the resulting and continuing inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, and jihadist carnage attest to the danger Iraq has become to its neighbors as a result of the U.S.-led invasion. (Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org </a>), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)   <a name="unbacking" id="unbacking"></a>THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ By Phyllis Bennis <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new set of Talking Points available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402un.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402un.html</a>). </blockquote> The U.S. is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington 's claim of legitimacy, is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help. Kofi Annan's decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the U.S., but also a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan's announcement indicated he was responding to the request of the U.S. occupation authorities and its hand-picked “governing council” to determine whether elections could be held by Washington's June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader definition of “what alternative arrangement would be acceptable” if not. Why Did the Bush Administration Change Their Line on the UN? 1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the U.S. occupation (especially the continuing deaths and mounting injuries of U.S. soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal power shift within the Bush administration, with the Pentagon ideologues tactically (and almost certainly temporarily) giving way to electorally focused considerations. In the battle between Rumsfeld/Cheney and Karl Rove, the Rumsfeld/Cheney team seems to have blinked first. 2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is Dick Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly refusing to even hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in the face of UN and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed location at all to travel to European capitals urging greater international support for the U.S. in Iraq, even calling on (though only once) the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure on Cheney's longstanding antagonism to multilateralism and the UN. What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Refuses to Return to Iraq Under U.S. Terms? What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Agrees to U.S. Terms? 1) If the UN completely rejects the U.S. proposal that it return to Iraq under the auspices of the U.S. occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating marginalization by the Bush administration, further threats to its independence, and the likelihood of being deemed “irrelevant” by the world's sole super-power. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization and the humanitarian agencies, reduce its already insufficient political support, and increase its threats and punishments of UN member states who stand defiant. 2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the U.S. occupation, the dangers are even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of international credibility, and the danger of being deemed an agent for or facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraq would again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN was acting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed under extreme U.S. pressure, Security Council resolution 1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the U.S. occupation of Iraq; it does not provide any legitimacy. So, What Should Be Done 1) There should be an immediate end to U.S. occupation, and withdrawal of American troops. Because the U.S. invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and undermined security for civilians throughout much of the country, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate for the United Nations, Arab League, and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to provide direct support for Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid (including control over all international funds, including those coming from the U.S. Congress, designated for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment. 2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial U.S.-imposed June 30th deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have to change before an election could be organized, assess what time frame would be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any election conducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair. (Phyllis Bennis <<a href="mailto:pbennis@compuserve.com">pbennis@compuserve.com</a>> is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="libyan"></a>LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS By Stephen Zunes <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../2004/0401libya.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0401libya.html</a>). </blockquote> In a world seemingly gone mad, it is ironic that one of the most sane and reasonable actions to come out of the Middle East recently has emanated from the government of Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator long recognized as an international outlaw. Libya's stunning announcement that it is giving up its nascent biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs and accepting international assistance and verification of its disarmament efforts is a small but important positive step in the struggle to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It would be a big mistake, however, to accept claims by the Bush administration and its supporters that it was the invasion of Iraq and other threatened uses of force against so-called "rogue states" which pursue WMD programs that led to Libya's decision to end its WMD programs. While Saddam Hussein was less than cooperative with United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) efforts in the 1990s, it appears that they were successful in ridding the country of its chemical and biological weapons and related facilities. The Iraqi regime was more cooperative during that period with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the IAEA announcing in 1998 that Iraq's nuclear program had been completely dismantled. When IAEA inspectors returned in the fall of 2002 as part of UN Security Council resolution 1441, they reported that no signs that the program had been revived. Iraq also allowed the return of a revived and strengthened inspections regime for chemical and biological weapons systems (known as UNMOVIC) at that time, which also found no evidence of any proscribed weapons or weapons programs. Despite this, the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew the government. As a result, Libya presumably knows that unilateral disarmament and allowing UN inspectors does not necessarily make you less safe from a possible U.S. invasion. More likely, Libya simply recognized that they would not get anything worthwhile as a result of continuing with an expensive, dangerous, and complex process of weapons development and would instead continue to face international isolation and difficulty obtaining certain dual-use technologies which could enhance the country's economic development. (Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org</a>) and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (online at <a href="http://www.commoncouragepress.com" target="_blank">www.commoncouragepress.com</a>).)   <a name="blair"></a>BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES By Ian Williams <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402blair.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402blair.html</a>). </blockquote> On the face of it, Tony Blair had an almost Clintonesque week as he walked away from two separate train wrecks seemingly unhurt. However, beneath the surface, there are deep internal injuries that have left him seriously weakened. His escape on the University fees issue by the tiniest handful of defections among Labor rebels was only contrived by Gordon Brown exercising his influence on some of the more prominent of them. Brown is preparing the ground for a “more in sorrow than in anger” replacement of an unelectable Blair before the next elections. He has pre-emptively cleared himself of disloyalty by acting as the, strictly temporary, king-saver. The leadership conflict in the Labor Party has been brought forward all the more sharply by the other “victory,” the Hutton Report. The Law Lord may have done British Prime Minister Tony Blair no favors at all, since public opinion overwhelmingly sees the report as a whitewash, and thus that the government has something to hide. Even the Report's attack on the integrity of the BBC has backfired. Three times as many British people polled trusted the BBC as compared to trusting the government. Indeed almost the only supporters the government and the Report had were the Murdoch press, the Sun and Times. And even their readers may wonder whether a media empire that has never allowed the truth to interfere with the smooth flow of proprietary prejudices really has the proper standing to attack the BBC's journalistic standards. There was a germ of truth in some of the Report's criticisms of the BBC's journalism. Ironically, under Thatcherite and New Labor pressures, it has relaxed its previous standards. The news is no longer scripted and read, based on “balance,” airing both sides. The good aspect is that, even though nominally a state-owned body, it has proved far more skeptical of the government than its privately owned counterparts in the USA. But if Andrew Gilligan had but just a shade more balance and qualifications in his initial report, as in fact he did in later versions, then he would not have left the Achilles Heel that Blair's media minders and Hutton got a noose into. Without some admission on his part, the public has to decide whether the Prime Minister was sincere, but either misled or stupid. Or he could have been so desperate to please George W. Bush that he persuaded himself that more evidence actually existed than there really was. Or he was so mendacious, that to conceal his real agenda of regime change, he marshaled a set of excuses that later failed. None of these positions actually strengthen his position, so he may follow the example of the BBC's bosses and do the honorable thing. Resign before the election. But like them, he will need a shove. Brown is waiting. (Ian Williams <<a href="mailto:uswarreport@igc.org">uswarreport@igc.org</a>> contributes frequently to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>) on UN and international affairs.)   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <a name="best" id="best"></a>THE BEST WE CAN DO Re: <a href="../..papers/03petropol/development.html">The Global Record on Oil</a> The best we European and American would do to end the waste of oil is to build smaller cars, go by bike, walk or take public transport electrically driven. And instead of spending money for exploring the Mars, we better invent electrically driven cars and use Earth Energy. And airplanes are, sorry to say, vehicles of the last century. Consumer must change their habits, above all. - Edwin Wagner, <a href="mailto:aewagth72@bluewin.ch"><aewagth72@bluewin.ch></a> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- <a name="interesting"></a>VERY INTERESTING Re: <a href="../../commentary/2003/0305roh.html" target="_parent">Eyes on Different Prizes </a> I found this article to be very interesting. Although I am young, I do have an interest in what happens in our world and how we would go about dealing with those issues. What I thought was the most interesting about this article was that how the U.S. and N. Korea have different goals set in my mind, I am pleased to hear that N. Korea abd S. Korea are working on their peace issues, and how we are building a better relationship then the one that we have with S. Korea already. Things obviously get rough but through our efforts and our patience we can get it all worked out. And with this article I think that's what we are doing with our best abilities. - Tina Dickerson, <a href="mailto:Wolfsreign@Wapda.com"><Wolfsreign@Wapda.com</a>>   <hr size="1" noshade> Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank&#151one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on <a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm</a> to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail. We Count on Your Support. 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